According to @BitMEXResearch, FTX, as a leveraged exchange, was supposed to match assets exactly to customer liabilities and not rely on a pooled set of high-risk assets to cover those liabilities. Source: @BitMEXResearch post on X dated Oct 15, 2025. This view aligns with the U.S. CFTC’s 2022 complaint alleging FTX and Alameda misappropriated customer funds and failed to segregate client assets, undermining one-to-one backing of liabilities. Source: U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, complaint filed Dec 13, 2022 (CFTC v. Samuel Bankman-Fried, FTX Trading Ltd., Alameda Research LLC). FTX Debtors’ Second Interim Report documented commingling and deficient records that left assets short of customer liabilities during the bankruptcy process. Source: FTX Debtors Second Interim Report by John J. Ray III, April 9, 2023. For trading, the clarification underscores that exchange counterparty risk can reprice quickly via wider basis and negative perpetual funding; in November 2022, BTC and ETH perps saw sharply negative funding and fragmented liquidity as exchange-risk perceptions surged after FTX’s collapse. Source: Kaiko research on post-FTX market structure and funding dynamics, November 2022. Traders can reduce exposure by prioritizing venues with independently verified proof of reserves plus liabilities, strict client asset segregation, and limited related-party exposures, which are core recommendations in global policy guidance. Source: IOSCO Final Report on Policy Recommendations for Crypto-Asset Service Providers, November 2023.